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Japan’s Unprecedented 
Aging and Changing 
Intergenerational Transfers
Naohiro Ogawa, Andrew Mason, Amonthep Chawla, 
and Rikiya Matsukura
4.1    Introduction
In 2005 the total world population exceeded 6.5 billion people, which is 
almost double the size observed in 1965 (United Nations 2007). The annual 
growth rate of the world population, however, has been declining continu-
ously during the past four decades; as opposed to its peak value of 2.02 
percent during 1965 to 1970, the current annual growth rate is estimated at 
1.17 percent. With the emergence of slower population growth in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, the world demographic outlook of today is 
substantially diﬀerent from the one of only a few decades ago.
Slowing global population growth has been induced primarily by a signiﬁ  -
cant decline in fertility over the past few decades. From 1965 to 1970, there 
were only eight countries with below-  replacement fertility (a total fertility 
rate [TFR] of less than 2.1 children per woman), a number that increased to 
sixty-  eight by the period of 2000 to 2005. Moreover, in terms of the popu-
lation share, as shown in ﬁ  gure 4.1, only 8.4 percent of the world’s population 
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lived in countries with below- replacement fertility between 1965 and 1970, as 
compared to 42.7 percent from 2005 to 2010. It is projected that more than 
half of the world population will live in countries with a fertility rate below the 
replacement level in the second half of the 2010s (United Nations 2007).
At present, the majority of these low-  fertility countries are in the devel-
oped regions. It should be emphasized, however, that the number of countries 
in developing regions with below- replacement fertility has also been increas-
ing at a phenomenal rate in recent years. It grew from nil to twenty-  four 
developing countries/  areas over the past four decades under consideration. 
Fourteen of these twenty-  four countries/  areas belong to Asia. Three Asian 
countries/  areas with below-  replacement fertility (Hong Kong, Macao, and 
the Republic of Korea) are currently classiﬁ  ed in the category of lowest- low 
fertility (i.e., those with a TFR below 1.3). In fact, East Asia’s fertility is now 
the lowest in the entire world (McDonald 2009).
Parallel to the worldwide decline in fertility, marked mortality improve-
ments have been achieved in most of the world. Approximately half of the 
world’s population succeeded in meeting the International Conference on 
Population and Development (ICPD) Program of Action goal of reaching a 
higher- than- seventy- years life expectancy at birth for both sexes from 2000 
to 2005. In many industrialized nations, life expectancy at birth is rapidly 
approaching eighty years. East Asia, Hong Kong, Macao, and Japan have 















Fig. 4.1    Proportion of population with below-  replacement fertility in the world 
population: 1950–  2050
Source: United Nations (2007).Japan’s Unprecedented Aging and Changing Intergenerational Transfers    1 3 3
As a result of these rapid fertility and mortality transformations, popu-
lation age distributions are being transformed, with a relative increase in the 
numbers of elderly and a relative decrease in the numbers of young. Thus, 
the twenty-  ﬁ  rst century is likely to become the century of population aging 
(Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov 2004).
In many countries, both developed and developing, the age structure shifts 
are generating a wide range of disruptions at both societal and familial 
levels. At the societal level, many governments, mainly in developed regions, 
are concerned about adverse eﬀects of population aging on various socio-
economic dimensions, ranging from their national productivity, labor supply 
and its quality, savings and capital formation, to the ﬁ  nancial sustainability 
of their pension schemes and health care programs. At the familial level, 
couples are having fewer children later in their lives. Marriage is delayed, 
more may never marry, and divorce is on the rise. More people are living 
alone, and more elderly couples are living independently from their chil-
dren. These family-  level demographic developments are aﬀecting the ways 
in which family members interact with each other, especially in providing 
support to their elderly parents and children (Ermisch 2003).
By and large, these general observations apply to contemporary Japan. 
Its postwar fertility decline was the earliest to occur in the nonWestern 
world, and was also the most rapid among all industrialized nations. Japan’s 
longevity is currently at the highest level in the contemporary world. As 
a consequence, Japan’s population has been aging extremely fast over the 
past several decades, and its proportion aged sixty- ﬁ  ve and over is currently 
the highest in the world. Japan’s social structure and family organization 
diﬀer substantially from those in developed nations in the West (Hodge and 
Ogawa 1991; Ogawa and Retherford 1993, 1997; MacKellar 2003; Ogawa, 
Retherford, and Matsukura 2009). For these reasons, Japan has already 
faced, and most likely will continue to encounter a variety of problems, both 
serious and unique, as it adjusts to population aging and adjusts resources 
allocated to a rapidly growing elderly population.
After reviewing some key features of Japan’s demographic dynamics dur-
ing the postwar period, we discuss the impact of population aging on both 
public and familial intergenerational transfers in Japan during the last few 
decades. We then describe some vital features of Japan’s socioeconomic 
system that have been aﬀected by rapid population aging with important 
implications for the welfare of the elderly over the foreseeable future. Japan’s 
ability to cope with population aging will be governed by public and familial 
systems of intergenerational transfers. We will rely on new estimates for 
Japan from 1984 to 2004, generated as part of an international project called 
National Transfer Accounts (NTA). In the ﬁ  nal section, we consider some 
policy options available to twenty-  ﬁ  rst-  century Japan for coping with its 
unprecedented population aging.
We conﬁ  ne the scope of this chapter speciﬁ  cally to the Japanese context. 
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may provide a useful base for analyzing important policy issues related to 
population aging in a number of developing countries, particularly those in 
Asia, which are currently undergoing rapid age structural transformations. 
Moreover, in the face of its fast postwar economic development, Japan still 
retains some of its traditional cultural values, which is why the Japanese model 
may be of relevance to policy makers in the developing regions who are inter-
ested in establishing a comprehensive approach by combining the best of 
traditional and modern values in providing care and support to the elderly.
4.2      Rapid Demographic Transition in Postwar Japan
4.2.1      Falling Fertility and Mortality
Japan’s fertility transition began in the early part of the twentieth century 
with gradual fertility reduction (Hodge and Ogawa 1991). After World War 
II, however, the tempo of the reduction became extremely rapid. Following 
a short baby boom period (1947 to 1949), Japan’s TFR declined by more 
than 50 percent from 4.54 to 2.04 children per woman between 1947 and 
1957. This 50 percent reduction of fertility over the ten-  year period is the 
ﬁ  rst such experience in documented history.
Thereafter, there were only minor ﬂ  uctuations around the replacement 
level until the ﬁ  rst oil crisis occurred in 1973, triggering a series of restruc-
turing in the Japanese economy, which, in turn, slowed down the pace of 
Japan’s economic growth. Parallel to this, Japan’s fertility level started to fall 
again, as presented in ﬁ  gure 4.2. By the mid-  1990s, Japan’s TFR declined 
below 1.5 children per woman. In 2005 it further plummeted to 1.26, low-
est in postwar time, before a rebound to 1.32 in 2006, and 1.34 in 2007. 
This post-  1973 decline is referred to by some demographers as “Japan’s 
second demographic transition” (Ogawa and Retherford 1993; Retherford 
and Ogawa 2006; Ogawa, Retherford, and Matsukura 2009).
In line with these changes in TFR, the birth cohort size varied consider-
ably over time, as depicted in ﬁ  gure 4.2. During the baby boom period, there 
were, on average, approximately 2.7 million births per year, but by 1957, 
the number of births decreased to 1.6 million. In the early 1970s, however, 
despite the low fertility rate, the number of births increased to more than 2 
million, as an “echo” eﬀect of the baby boom, or the often called “second-
 generation baby boomers.” Since then, births have again trended downward, 
reaching slightly less than 1.1 million in 2007. This represents a 60 percent 
decline in the annual number of births from record levels reached in the 
late 1940s.
Japan’s fertility has attracted a great deal of attention both at home and 
abroad. In contrast, relatively limited attention has been paid to the speed 
of Japan’s postwar mortality transition. From 1950 to 1952, life expectancy 
at birth was 59.6 years for men and 63.0 years for women. In 2007, male Japan’s Unprecedented Aging and Changing Intergenerational Transfers    1 3 5
life expectancy at birth reached 79.2 years to become the third highest in 
the world, following Iceland (79.4 years) and Hong Kong (79.3 years), and 
female life expectancy rose to 86.0 years, the highest in the world, followed 
by Hong Kong (85.4 years) and France (84.1 years). Moreover, between 1950 
and 2007, life expectancy at age sixty- ﬁ  ve grew to a substantial extent, from 
11.4 to 18.6 years for men, and from 13.4 to 23.6 years for women, which 
implies a marked increase in the retirement period and in the joint survival 
to older ages for both husbands and wives.
The remarkable increase in longevity has inﬂ  uenced many aspects of Japan’s 
economy. In 2007, insurance companies reduced premiums substantially for 
the ﬁ  rst time in eleven years (The Asahi Shimbun 2007). The composition of 
sales by Japanese life insurance companies have shifted in response to longer 
life expectancy, lower childbearing, and rising divorce. In 2008, for the ﬁ  rst 
time ever, outstanding annuity and medical insurance policies, rather than 
life insurance contracts, constituted more than half of the products sold by 
Japanese life insurance companies (The Nikkei 2008a).
A remarkable feature of aging is rapid growth in the number of centenar-
ians. The average annual growth rate, 13 percent over the period from 1963 
to 2007, exceeds that of any other age group in Japan.
In ﬁ  gure 4.3, the data on the average age of the thirty oldest deaths in each 
year over the period from 1950 to 2006 are plotted separately for men and 














































Fig. 4.2    Trends in number of births and TFR: Japan, 1947–  2006
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, Vital Statistics, various years.136        Naohiro Ogawa, Andrew Mason, Amonthep Chawla, and Rikiya Matsukura
over the second half of the twentieth century for both sexes; in 2006 the 
average age of the thirty oldest deaths was 107.6 years for men and 109.9 
years for women. More importantly, the plotted trends of the thirty oldest 
deaths indicate that the tempo of life prolongation accelerated for both 
sexes since the mid- 1960s, a few years after the implementation of universal 
health coverage.
4.2.2      Population Decline and Aging
Although the number of elderly in Japan has been increasing rapidly, the 
number of children, those under age ﬁ  fteen, has been declining for twenty-
  seven consecutive years; Japan now has fewer children than at any time 
since 1908 (Washington Post 2008). The overall size of Japan’s population 
began declining from the end of 2005. According to a population projec-
tion based on the most recent version of the population-  economic-  social 
security model constructed by the Nihon University Population Research 
Institute (Ogawa et al. 2003), the total population is expected to decrease to 
121.1 million persons in 2025, a 5.2 percent reduction from 2005.
Changes in age structure and other important demographic data are 
reported in table 4.1. The proportion of the population aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and 
older increased from 4.9 percent in 1950 to 20.2 percent in 2005, and is pro-





















Fig. 4.3    Change in average age of death among thirty oldest persons by sex: 
Japan, 1950–  2006
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, Vital Statistics, various years.
Note: The trend lines for men and women have been estimated on the data from 1950 to 
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tinue to be the world’s oldest national population for the next twenty years. 
More importantly, the Japanese population will reach the world’s highest 
level of aging at an unprecedented rate, as discussed elsewhere (Ogawa and 
Retherford 1997; Ogawa et al. 2003). Compared with such European coun-
tries as Sweden and Norway, the tempo of aging in Japan is approximately 
three times as fast. Furthermore, the percentage of the population aged 
seventy- ﬁ  ve and older among those aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and older is projected 
to increase from 45.1 percent in 2005 to 60.0 percent in 2025. Comparing 
NUPRI projections and recent United Nations (2007) projections reveals 
that Japan’s concentration in the seventy- ﬁ  ve and older age group is likely to 
be by far the highest in the world in 2025, followed by Sweden (52.1 percent) 
and Italy (51.8 percent).
4.3      Changing Economic Growth Performance 
and Public Transfer Programs
4.3.1    Macroeconomic  Growth
During World War II, Japan’s productive capacity was utterly shattered. 
In 1959, Japan’s per capita gross national product (GNP) was only U.S. $153, 
lower than that of Mexico (U.S. $181) or the Philippines (U.S. $172). By the 
end of the 1950s, however, Japan’s real per capita income had recovered to 



















1950 83,200 35.4 4.9 3.65 67.5 25.7 1.82
1955 89,276 33.4 5.3 2.37 63.1 29.2 1.81
1960 93,419 33.0 5.7 2.00 60.4 30.4 1.80
1965 98,275 25.6 6.3 2.14 46.8 30.3 1.77
1970 103,720 23.9 7.1 2.13 44.9 30.2 1.69
1975 111,940 24.3 7.9 1.91 47.6 32.0 1.60
1980 117,060 23.5 9.1 1.75 48.4 34.4 1.48
1985 121,049 21.5 10.3 1.76 46.7 37.8 1.40
1990 123,611 18.2 12.1 1.54 43.5 40.1 1.30
1995 125,570 16.0 14.6 1.42 50.4 39.3 1.10
2000 126,926 14.6 17.4 1.36 46.9 40.9 0.91
2005 127,449 13.8 20.2 1.25 50.6 45.1 0.77
2010 127,013 13.0 23.0 1.24 55.6 48.0 0.65
2015 125,603 12.1 26.9 1.24 63.2 48.4 0.59
2020 123,235 11.0 29.5 1.24 67.6 52.1 0.57
2025   120,094   10.2   31.0   1.28   70.0   60.0   0.56
Sources: Statistics Bureau, Population Census, various years. Nihon University Population 
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prewar levels. During the 1960s, Japan’s real GDP grew at a phenomenal 
rate of about 11 percent per annum. After the oil crisis of 1973, as men-
tioned earlier, Japan’s economic growth performance became signiﬁ  cantly 
less impressive. In the mid- 1980s, the Japanese economy entered the bubble 
economy phase. Its investment boom ended abruptly in the second half of 
1990 and a number of leading banks and other ﬁ  nancial institutions became 
insolvent. Government debt has been accumulating at an alarming rate, 
reaching U.S. $8.49 trillion in 2008. Debt has more than doubled during the 
last ten years, and its relative size to GDP is by far the worst among indus-
trialized nations. Japan’s international competitiveness has deteriorated very 
quickly. In the early 1990s its economy ranked ﬁ  rst in terms of international 
competitiveness, but it fell to the twenty-  second place in 2008 (IMD 2008). 
In view of these prolonged economic problems, some economists call the 
1990s “Japan’s lost decade” (Yoshikawa 2001).
Japan has undertaken many important structural reforms of its economy, 
but its mandatory retirement policy still remains an extreme case as com-
pared with other industrialized nations (Clark et al. 2008). The proportion 
of ﬁ  rms having mandatory retirement rules has been increasing, not decreas-
ing. The Japanese government is currently attempting to encourage ﬁ  rms to 
increase the mandatory retirement age to sixty-  ﬁ  ve. The Law Concerning 
Stabilization of Employment of Older Persons, passed in 2004, requires 
ﬁ  rms to increase the age of mandatory retirement to sixty- ﬁ  ve. However, no 
penalties are imposed for noncompliance (Japan Institute of Labour Policy 
and Training 2004).
Despite these mandatory retirement policies, the elderly have high labor 
participation rates by international standards (Ogawa, Lee, and Matsukura 
2005; Matsukura, Ogawa, and Clark 2007). In 2000, the labor force partici-
pation rate for elderly Japanese men aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and over was greater 
than 30 percent. In sharp contrast, the corresponding ﬁ  gure for developed 
countries in Europe was below 10 percent, and was 18 percent for the United 
States. Similarly, Japanese women are more likely to continue working than 
older women in Europe and the United States.
4.3.2      Old-  Age Pension and Medical Care Plans
As Japan recovered from the shambles of World War II, it established uni-
versal pension and medical care schemes in 1961. Since then, Japan’s social 
security system has grown remarkably. Between 1961 and 2005, the share 
of social security beneﬁ  ts increased from 4.9 to 23.9 percent of the national 
income (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 
2007). Moreover, the proportion of the social security expenditure allotted 
to the pension schemes increased from 22.7 percent in 1964 to 52.7 percent in 
2005, while the corresponding value for the medical schemes declined from 
54.4 to 32.0 percent. Owing to population aging, as well as the maturity of 
the old- age pension schemes, the relative share of pension beneﬁ  ts paid out 
in national income has been on an upward trend in recent years.Japan’s Unprecedented Aging and Changing Intergenerational Transfers    1 3 9
Japan undertook major reforms of its public pension schemes in 2004. 
One of the primary objectives was to ﬁ  x the level of future contributions 
for younger workers and thereby increase transparency, without reducing 
the beneﬁ  ts considerably. The government introduced a mechanism to auto-
matically balance beneﬁ  t levels according to future changes in the popu-
lation age structure. The goal was to avoid repeated reforms and to restore 
the younger generations’ trust in government pension schemes. This may 
be regarded as a paradigm shift in Japan’s social security provisions (Saka-
moto 2005). As a consequence of the 2004 reform, the replacement rate for 
the Japanese public pension declined considerably, and is projected to fall 
to 50.2 percent by 2023, after which, it is assumed, will remain unchanged 
up to 2050.
Such downward adjustments of beneﬁ  ts have been clearly reﬂ  ected in the 
expectations of the Japanese. According to a national survey on the eco-
nomic life of the elderly undertaken by the Cabinet Oﬃce during January 
to February, 2007 (The Nikkei 2008b), 56.9 percent of respondents aged 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve and over (including baby boomers nearing the mandatory retire-
ment age) stated that their pension beneﬁ  ts would fall short of their living 
expenses from age sixty. In the 2002 round of this survey, the proportion of 
those who held this pessimistic view was 46.6 percent.
The second major component of social security beneﬁ  ts is medical. Sub-
ject to Japan’s economic growth performance, the coverage in medical insur-
ance plans has been revised on a periodic basis. Despite the changes that 
have taken place in the past few decades, the absolute amount of ﬁ  nan-
cial resources allotted to medical care services has been rising. One of the 
problems that have set Japan apart from other industrialized nations is an 
extremely long period of hospitalization (Ogawa et al. 2007). In 2005 it was 
35.7 days, which is the longest among the nineteen Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, followed by 13.4 
days in France (OECD 2007).
In response to the upward spiral in medical care costs, the government 
of Japan implemented the Long-  Term Care Insurance (LTCI) scheme in 
2000 with a view to reducing the average duration of hospitalization for 
inpatient care by facilitating in-  home care. The LTCI scheme was expected 
to alleviate the care- giving burden to be placed upon family members, many 
of whom are middle-  aged women (Ogawa and Retherford 1997). Because 
the expenditure for the LTCI scheme had grown at an alarming rate since its 
inception, the scope of its services was critically reviewed and downgraded 
in 2006 with a view to curbing future costs.
In April 2008, the government implemented a new medical insurance 
scheme speciﬁ  cally for senior citizens aged seventy- ﬁ  ve and older as another 
step toward curbing the nation’s mushrooming medical costs. Under this 
new medical scheme, premiums are automatically deducted from pension 
payouts. However, because premiums have actually become higher under 
the new scheme for a certain segment of the targeted elderly age group, a 140        Naohiro Ogawa, Andrew Mason, Amonthep Chawla, and Rikiya Matsukura
possible revision of the new scheme has already become an urgent political 
issue.
4.4      Weakening Familial Support and Abrupt Normative Shifts
As distinct from developed countries in the West, multigenerational living 
arrangements are still fairly common in Japan (Ogawa and Ermisch 1996; 
Ogawa, Retherford, and Matsukura 2009). Although three-  generational 
households persist in Japan, the proportion of elderly living with adult 
children is declining and with it the potential for family support for the 
elderly. As shown in ﬁ  gure 4.4, the proportion of those aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and 
over coresiding with their adult children declined from 70 percent in 1980 
to 43 percent in 2005. In addition, the index called the familial support ratio 
(expressed as the ratio of women aged forty to ﬁ  fty-  nine to elderly persons 
aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve to seventy-  nine) is expected to decline substantially over the 
next twenty years. The value of this index was 1.30 in 1990, and is projected 
to be 0.65 in 2010, a 50 percent decline. The present value of this index is the 
lowest in the entire world and is expected to continue to be so for another 
twenty years.
Apart from these demographic transformations, value shifts among Japa-
nese people have been dramatic. These value changes are well captured in the 
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Year
Living with children Living with married children Living with unmarried children Living with children Living with married children Living with unmarried children
Fig. 4.4    Change in proportion of those aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and over coresiding with 
their adult children: Japan, 1980–  2006
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions 
of the People: Health and Welfare, various years.Japan’s Unprecedented Aging and Changing Intergenerational Transfers    1 4 1
every other year from 1950 to 2004 by the Mainichi Newspapers (Population 
Problems Research Council 2004). Since the ﬁ  rst round of the survey, except 
for a few rounds, a question regarding dependence on children for old-  age 
security had been directed to currently married women of reproductive age 
who have at least one child. In addition to these time-  series data obtained 
by the Mainichi Newspapers, we have extended the time span, as depicted 
in ﬁ  gure 4.5, by utilizing data collected in the National Survey on Work and 
Family, undertaken by the Nihon University Population Research Institute 
in 2007.
The precoded responses were as follows: (a) “expect to depend on chil-
dren,” (b) “do not expect to depend on children,” and (c) “never thought 
about it.” The proportion of respondents who expect to depend on their 
children declined almost continuously over the period from 1950 to 2004. 
Almost two-  thirds of Japanese married women in 1950 expected to depend 
on their children for old-  age security, but only 9 percent in 2007 expected 
to do so. These long-  term downward trends in parents’ expectations for 
familial support closely parallel the expansion of old-  age public pensions 
since the early 1960s.
In the National Survey conducted by the Mainichi Newspapers since 1963, 
the question on the attitude of married women towards taking care of their 
aged parents was asked in successive rounds. The precoded response cat-
80
90



















“Expect to depend on children”
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Year
Fig. 4.5    Trends in values and expectations about care for the elderly: Japan, 
1950– 2007
Sources: Mainichi Newspapers of Japan, Summary of Twenty-  ﬁ  fth National Survey on Family 
Planning, 2005. Mainichi Newspapers of Japan, Summary of the 2004 round of the National 
Survey on Population, Families and Generations, 2004. Nihon University Population Research 
Institute, National Survey on Work and Family, 2007.142        Naohiro Ogawa, Andrew Mason, Amonthep Chawla, and Rikiya Matsukura
egories are as follows: (a) “good custom,” (b) “natural duty as children,” 
(c) “unavoidable due to inadequacy of public support resources,” and (d) 
“not a good custom.” We have also supplemented these time-  series data 
compiled by the Mainichi Newspapers with the data gathered by Nihon Uni-
versity. As indicated in ﬁ  gure 4.5, the proportion of those who chose one 
of the ﬁ  rst two response categories (“good custom” and “natural duty as 
children”) was stable from 1963 to 1986. From 1986 to 1988, however, a 
sudden decline occurred. In the years leading up to 2007, the proportion of 
married women of reproductive age who chose one of these two response 
categories was, by and large, declining.
Obviously, these demographic and socioeconomic transformations in 
postwar Japan have been aﬀecting the pattern and mode of intergenerational 
transfers over time. To analyze these changes in intergenerational transfers, 
we will draw heavily upon some of the principal ﬁ  ndings recently generated 
from the National Transfer Account (NTA) project for Japan. A detailed 
explanation of NTA’s basic concept, the crucial computational assumptions 
used, and the deﬁ  nitions of key variables are available on the NTA home 
page  (http:/ / www.ntaccounts.org).
4.5      Population Aging, Intergenerational Transfers, 
and Two Demographic Dividends
The economic life cycle is fundamental to understanding the macroeco-
nomic eﬀects of population aging. As has been recently discussed elsewhere 
(Bloom and Williamson 1998; Mason 2001, 2007; Mason and Lee 2006, 
2007), the divergence between production and consumption interacts with 
changing population age structure to generate a demographic dividend, 
which has been substantial but transitory in Asia. Mason and Lee have 
shown that a second and sustainable dividend is possible due to increased 
accumulation of physical or human capital (Lee and Mason 2009; Mason 
2007; Mason and Lee 2007). One of the key components of the NTA sys-
tem is detailed information pertaining to the life cycle of production (labor 
income) and consumption. This information can be used to calculate the 
economic support ratio and quantify the extent to which per capita income 
has been inﬂ  uenced by changes in the working share of the population; that 
is, the ﬁ  rst demographic dividend. The economic life cycle also provides key 
information for modeling the second demographic dividend, as explained 
below.
Fertility decline leads to the ﬁ  rst demographic dividend because the popu-
lation in the working ages increases relative to nonworking ages. This is 
incomplete, however, because gains depend both on what is produced at each 
age and what is consumed. The ﬁ  rst demographic dividend arises because 
the population is concentrated in ages during which production exceeds con-
sumption. Measuring the dividend in growth terms, the ﬁ  rst demographic Japan’s Unprecedented Aging and Changing Intergenerational Transfers    1 4 3
dividend is positive when the growth rate of the number of eﬀective produc-
ers exceeds that of the number of eﬀective consumers (Mason 2007).
Figure 4.6 shows estimates of age proﬁ  les of per capita consumption, 
both private and public sectors combined, and per capita production (labor 
income) in ﬁ  ve selected years: 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004. These pro-
ﬁ  les have been estimated by drawing upon private-  sector data from ﬁ  ve 
rounds of the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE) 
from 1984 to 2004, carried out by the Statistics Bureau of Japan, and public-
  sector data for the corresponding ﬁ  ve years, gleaned from various govern-
ment publications. The estimates are expressed in terms of 2000 prices using 
the GDP deﬂ  ator.
A few points of interest emerge from this graphical exposition. First, 
as expected, throughout the time periods under review, there are sizeable 
income- consumption  deﬁ  cits at both young and older life-  cycle stages. 
These life-  cycle deﬁ  cits must be funded with reallocations coming largely 
from the surplus of income generated at the life cycle surplus stage.
Second, the age at which an average individual shifts from a net consumer 
to a net producer gradually increased from twenty- four in 1984 and 1989 to 
twenty- ﬁ  ve in 1994, and to twenty- six in 1999 and 2004. A number of factors 
contributed to the upward trend in the crossing age: (a) earnings proﬁ  les, 
(b) hours worked, (c) women’s labor force participation and the availability 
of child- care and old- age leave schemes, (d) sectoral shifts in the labor force, 
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Fig.  4.6  Age-  speciﬁ  c proﬁ  les of per capita consumption and production: Japan, 
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freeters (those aged ﬁ  fteen to thirty- four who lack full- time employment or 
are unemployed) and NEETs (those not currently engaged in employment, 
education or training).
At the other end of the life cycle, the age transition from a net producer 
to a net consumer rose marginally from ﬁ  fty- eight in 1984 and 1989 to ﬁ  fty-
 nine in 1994, 1999, and 2004. The persistency of the crossing age at the later 
stage of the life cycle can be traced to Japan’s mandatory retirement age of 
sixty. The length of time in the cross- section when individuals are producing 
more through their labor than they are consuming ranged from thirty- three 
to thirty-  four years, only two-  ﬁ  fths of the average length of life in present 
day Japan.
Third, labor income increased substantially between 1984 and 1994 reﬂ  ect-
ing the substantial economic growth during the “bubble economy” phase. 
The age proﬁ  les of per capita production changed little between 1994 and 
2004 reﬂ  ecting the inﬂ  uence of Japan’s “lost decade.” The growth in labor 
income that occurred during the entire twenty-  year period is concentrated 
in the prime working ages. Labor income below age twenty-  ﬁ  ve or above 
age sixty-  ﬁ  ve was essentially constant or declined.
Fourth and more importantly, the age proﬁ  les of per capita consumption 
rose almost continuously, particularly at the younger and older ages. Of 
particular note is the emergence of an upward sloping consumption curve 
among those aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and over in 2004. This is accounted for by the 
implementation of the LTCI scheme starting from the year 2000. In-  home 
care for the frail elderly, which had until then been informally provided by 
their family members, became formalized as a part of the market economy. 
As a result, Japan’s per capita consumption proﬁ  les have been increasingly 
similar to those in Finland, the United States, Sweden, and Costa Rica 
among the NTA member countries.
How and why the economic life cycle is changing in Japan is an important 
issue, but the concern here is the eﬀects of age structure given the age pat-
terns of consumption and labor income observed in Japan. This analysis 
is based on an average of the ﬁ  ve sets of proﬁ  les shown in ﬁ  gure 4.6. The 
age- speciﬁ  c values, shown in ﬁ  gure 4.7, are used as weights to calculate 
the eﬀective number of producers and the eﬀective number of consumers 
over the period from 1925 to 2025. The ratio of producers to consumers is 
the economic support ratio. The ﬁ  rst demographic dividend is deﬁ  ned as 
the annual growth rate of the economic support ratio, which measures the 
change in output per eﬀective consumer due solely to changes in age struc-
ture (ﬁ  gure 4.8). For thirty-  four consecutive years from 1945 to 1979, the 
eﬀective number of producers grew more rapidly than the eﬀective number 
of consumers in Japan. The magnitude of the positive ﬁ  rst demographic 
dividend was large, adding just over 1 percent per year to economic growth 









































































































Fig.  4.7  Average  age-  speciﬁ  c proﬁ  les of annual per capita consumption and pro-
duction: Japan, 1984–  2004
Fig. 4.8    Trend in ﬁ  rst demographic dividend: Japan, 1925–  2025146        Naohiro Ogawa, Andrew Mason, Amonthep Chawla, and Rikiya Matsukura
As has been the case with other developed countries, Japan’s ﬁ  rst demo-
graphic dividend lasted for a few decades, but proved inherently transitory 
in nature. Since the mid-  1990s the eﬀective number of producers has been 
growing more slowly than the eﬀective number of consumers, the economic 
support ratio has been declining, and the ﬁ  rst dividend has turned decidedly 
negative. This change is a direct consequence of population aging.
The same demographic forces that produce an end to the ﬁ  rst dividend may 
lead to a second demographic dividend. Implicit in the large gap between 
consumption and production at old ages is the life cycle demand for wealth. 
To support consumption which in old-  age greatly exceeds production, life 
cycle pension wealth must be accumulated in one of the two following forms. 
One form is transfer wealth or the net present value of public and private 
transfers. The second form is assets, which consists of capital, land, foreign 
assets, and the like. As a population ages, the demand for life-  cycle pension 
wealth increases substantially. In part, this occurs because the duration of 
retirement is longer due to increased life expectancy and, in part, because of 
changes in the age composition of the population. If the demand for wealth 
is met by expanding transfer wealth, then population aging leads to large 
implicit debts imposed on future generations. If countries rely on capital 
accumulation to meet the retirement needs of the elderly, population aging 
provides a powerful incentive to accumulate capital and other assets. A key 
point is that in countries that rely on transfers, both public and familial, in 
meeting the retirement needs of the elderly, the second demographic divi-
dend will not emerge. While the ﬁ  rst dividend is purely accounting- oriented, 
the second dividend consists of both compositional and behavioral eﬀects 
(Mason 2007; Ogawa and Matsukura 2007; Mason and Lee 2007). The 
second dividend is aﬀected not only by the numbers of the elderly persons 
relative to younger persons, but also by the extent to which consumers and 
policy makers are forward-  looking and respond eﬀectively to the demo-
graphic changes that are anticipated in the years ahead. When life expec-
tancy is increasing, for example, the impetus for accumulating wealth is 
stimulated, which, in turn, leads to a permanent increase in income. To 
summarize, if capital accumulation rather than familial or public transfer 
programs dominate the age reallocation systems for supporting the elderly, 
population aging may yield a second demographic dividend due to higher 
rates of saving and capital intensiﬁ  cation of the economy.
Compared with the ﬁ  rst dividend, measuring the second dividend is dif-
ﬁ  cult, in part because the accumulation of wealth is intrinsically forward-
  looking. The demand for wealth depends on expectations about the future 
that can not be directly measured. In the present study, we have followed a 
relatively simple partial equilibrium method. As fully discussed elsewhere 
(Mason 2007), the second dividend is deﬁ  ned as the growth rate of produc-
tivity or output per labor income that arises because of an increase in the 
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The estimates of the second demographic dividend over the period from 
1960 to 2035 are shown in ﬁ  gure 4.9. Japan’s second demographic dividend is 
very high in the 1980s, generating almost 1.5 percentage points of additional 
economic growth. Beginning from the 1990s, the second demographic divi-
dend ﬂ  uctuates to a considerable extent, with a trough in the 2010s, followed 
by a small upsurge in the 2020s. These oscillations occur primarily because 
the second generation of baby boomers enters the age group of ﬁ  fty years 
old and over, in which they are expected to save at a high rate.
Undoubtedly, depending on how the Japanese elderly utilize or allocate 
their current and future accumulated wealth, the Japanese economy’s future 
scenarios will be substantially diﬀerent. Numerous banks and life insurance 
companies are aware of this phenomenon and have recently been paying 
great attention to the baby boomers born between 1947 and 1949, who are 
now approaching their mandatory age of retirement. They have already 
contributed greatly to creating both ﬁ  rst and second demographic dividends 
over the course of Japan’s demographic transition after World War II, and 
they are expected to enjoy the fruits of the second demographic dividend 
during their retirement life, as hinted in ﬁ  gure 4.9.
Figure 4.10 plots the age proﬁ  le of asset holding in Japan in 1999 among 
those aged sixty and over. Using the 1999 round of NSFIE, we have esti-
mated their age-  speciﬁ  c stock of real and ﬁ  nancial assets. In addition, we 
have computed the present value of the expected future stream of public 
pension beneﬁ  ts. The detailed computational procedure and assumptions 
employed are available elsewhere (Ogawa and Matsukura 2007). A quick 
glance at this graph reveals that the Japanese elderly are wealthy. At age 
Fig. 4.9    Trend in second demographic dividend: Japan, 1960–  2035148        Naohiro Ogawa, Andrew Mason, Amonthep Chawla, and Rikiya Matsukura
sixty, the total amount of assets an average person owns is more than 50 
million yen, or U.S. $0.5 million. In fact, they are wealthier than what this 
graph shows, because private pensions are not included in the computation. 
Also, familial transfers are not included in ﬁ  gure 4.10, but they are discussed 
below.
A striking feature of the graph is that the present value of public pen-
sion beneﬁ  ts to be paid to the elderly is greater than that of real assets at 
a relatively early stage of retirement life, but the latter exceeds the former 
by a great margin at a later stage of retirement life. A possible explanation 
is that the liquidation of real assets such as land and housing is crucial for 
very old persons, particularly those who are living alone. There seems to be 
a substantial potential for developing various ﬁ  nancial schemes such as the 
reverse mortgage plan. These are cross-  section estimates, however, so that 
other explanations may be important.
An additional feature of the demand for wealth in Japan is that the pref-
erence for land has declined considerably over the last ﬁ  fteen years or so, 
during Japan’s lost decade. According to various rounds of the National 
Opinion Survey on Land Issues conducted by the Ministry of the National 
Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, the proportion of those aged 
sixty and over who thought that land was a better asset than ﬁ  nancial assets 
such as savings and securities declined from 63 percent in 1994 to 37 per-
cent in 2007 (ﬁ  gure 4.11). This suggests that an increasing proportion of 
the Japanese elderly need more information regarding investment oppor-
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appropriate knowledge pertaining to various ﬁ  nancial markets. According 
to a recent report released by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD [2005]), 71 percent of the population aged twenty 
and over have no knowledge about investment in equities and bonds, 57 
percent have no knowledge of ﬁ  nancial products in general, and 29 per-
cent have no knowledge about insurance, pensions, and tax. The ongoing 
global ﬁ  nancial crisis will surely inﬂ  uence preferences and knowledge over 
the coming years.
To cope with these problems, the Financial Services Agency of the Japa-
nese Government implemented the Financial Instruments and Exchange 
Law, eﬀective from September 30, 2007. This ﬁ  nancial business law aims at 
enhancing investor protection by tightening the rules for ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions’ sales of stocks, investment trusts, and other products that could cause 
holders to suﬀer a loss of principal. As a result, in order to avoid possible reg-
ulatory trouble, one of the major banks decided not to sell risk instruments 
to customers aged eighty and over unless they can demonstrate suﬃcient 
knowledge of investing or are accompanied by other family members at the 
time of purchase (The Nikkei 2007). The large bank requires that customers 
aged seventy and over receive explanation concerning the risks involved at 
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Fig. 4.11    Changing preference for land as an asset among the elderly aged sixty 
and over: Japan, 1994–  2007
Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism, National Opinion Survey 
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Another leading bank has recently begun the practice of visiting customers 
aged ninety and over once every three months, even if their products do not 
suﬀer any losses.
4.6      Changing Pattern of Life Cycle Deﬁ  cits and Age Reallocations
The eﬀect of population aging on the accumulation of assets will depend 
on the system for reallocating resources across age. The NTA system pro-
vides a comprehensive framework for estimating consumption, production, 
and resource reallocations by age. The NTA measures intergenerational 
ﬂ  ows for a certain period of time (usually a calendar or ﬁ  scal year), and its 
ﬂ  ow account is governed by the following expression:
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where Yl   labor income, YA   asset income,      transfers received, C   
consumption, S   saving, and  –    transfers given. It should be noted that 
this ﬂ  ow identity holds for each age x as well as the whole economy.
Rearranging the terms, the life cycle deﬁ  cit, namely, the diﬀerence between 
consumption and labor income, C(x) –  Yl(x), must be equal to the inter- age 
ﬂ  ows or reallocations that come in the following two forms: net transfers, 
 (x)      (x) –    –  (x), and asset-  based reallocations, YA(x) –   S(x); thereby 
giving us the following equation:
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The age reallocations can be further disaggregated into public- sector and 
private-  sector age reallocations. That is,
 C (x)   Yl(x)   ⎣ g
 (x)    g
 (x)⎦   ⎣ f
 (x)    f
 (x)⎦ 
    ⎣YAg(x)   Sg(x)⎦   ⎣YAf(x)   Sf(x)⎦,
where subscripts, g and f, refer to public and private age reallocations, re-
spectively.
Before we proceed to the discussion of computational results, we would 
like to caution the reader about the following two points. First, both “famil-
ial transfers” and “private transfers” are used interchangeably in this chap-
ter; both of the terms refer to transfers coming from other family members 
of the same or diﬀerent households. Second, the private transfers presented 
here are limited to current transfers. Capital transfers, for example, bequests 
and inter vivos capital transfers, are not included.
It is also important to note that the estimated values for the totals are 
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(NIPA), thus insuring consistency with NIPA. Labor income, however, does 
not exactly correspond to the NIPA counterpart, because the income of 
those self-  employed (mixed income) includes returns to labor and capital. 
Based upon the result derived from one of the recent studies (Gollin 2002), 
we have opted to allocate two-  thirds of this income to labor and one-  third 
to capital.
Figure 4.12 presents the changing pattern of three components of the 
age reallocations for 1984 to 2004. The three components consist of real-
locations through assets, net public transfers, and net private transfers. All 
values are measured in terms of 2000 constant prices and on an annual basis. 
Panel A presents age reallocations for 1984, panel B for 1994, and panel C 
for 2004.
There are many important changes in age reallocations over this twenty-
  year period. First, the impact of the rapid growth of the elderly population 
upon transfers is very clear. Net total transfers to those aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and 
older increased by three times from 1984 to 2004. The increase is entirely a 
consequence of net public transfers to the elderly that grew 4.4 times in real 
terms. In contrast, the amount of net familial transfers to the elderly declines 
by 75 percent during the same period. Assets have become extremely impor-
tant for the elderly population—asset-  based reallocations increased by ten 
times in real terms from 1984 to 2004. Despite such phenomenal growth of 
asset-  based reallocations, net public transfers dominated asset-  based real-
locations for the elderly population in 2004.
Second, despite a large decline in the young population, net transfers to 
those aged zero to nineteen grew by 9 percent during the two decades. The 
composition of the net transfers changed appreciably over time. Net public 
transfers to this age group rose by 35 percent in real terms, while net familial 
transfers declined by 7 percent.
Third, though relevant tables are omitted, on a per capita basis, net public 
transfers to both elderly and young persons doubled over the period in ques-
tion. More importantly, while the amount of net familial transfers to the 
young population during the two decades rose by 34 percent, there was a 70 
percent decline for the elderly population.
Fourth, net public transfers are negative for the productive age groups 
twenty to ﬁ  fty-  nine with the peak shifting rightward (to higher ages) over 
time, reﬂ  ecting the inﬂ  uence of population aging (ﬁ  gure 4.12). In 2004, the 
peak occurred approximately at age ﬁ  fty- seven, while in the earlier years the 
peak occurred between ages forty to ﬁ  fty. On a per capita basis, however, 
the peak of the tax burden remained relatively stable in the vicinity of age 
ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve during the period under consideration.
Fifth, the role of asset-  based reallocations became increasingly impor-
tant over time particularly for the elderly, as can be clearly seen from the 
three panels of ﬁ  gure 4.12. Although asset-  based reallocations occur in 
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in the private sector has consistently dominated those in the public sector. 
Furthermore, a positive asset- based reallocation implies that people receive 
asset income in excess of their saving. In 2004, for instance, positive asset-
 based reallocations reach their peak when people are in their sixties, and are 
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Fig. 4.12    Changing pattern of three components of reallocations: Japan, 1984–
 2004:  A, 1984; B, 1994; C, 2004.
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contrast, the small negative asset-  based reallocation at young ages in 1984 
occurred mainly owing to public saving exceeding public asset income.
Sixth, a careful examination of the three panels reveals that net familial 
transfers are negative among relatively young elderly persons. This phenom-
enon is particularly pronounced in 2004 among the elderly in their sixties 
and seventies (panel C of ﬁ  gure 4.12). The ﬁ  nancial assistance relatively 
young elderly persons provided to their adult children and/ or grandchildren 
exceeded the monetary assistance the young elderly received. The magnitude 
of negative net familial transfers for relatively young elderly rose during the 
period of Japan’s lost decade in which the unemployment rate remained at 
a very high level and labor income hardly grew at all in either nominal or 
real terms. The data displayed in ﬁ  gure 4.13 further substantiates the validity 
of this interpretation: all age groups received positive net intra-  household 
transfers from the sixty-   to seventy-  four-  year old age group.
Moreover, according to a nationwide survey undertaken by the Nihon 
University Population Research Institute in April 2007, the proportion of 
the survey respondents in their forties who had received ﬁ  nancial assistance 
from their parents over the previous twelve months was approximately 50 
percent higher than that of those who had provided ﬁ  nancial assistance to 
their parents. These results suggest that despite the fact that multigenera-
tional coresidence has been eroding over the past few decades, the Japanese 
elderly are still playing a vital role in providing ﬁ  nancial support for their 
oﬀspring when the latter encounter economic diﬃculties. Although older 
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actually playing a key role as a safety net. For this reason, they should be 
considered latent assets in contemporary Japanese society. Ironically, ﬁ  lial 
norms among the middle-  aged have been deteriorating since the late 1980s 
as displayed in ﬁ  gure 4.5, and this could be interpreted as partial evidence 
that elderly parents, despite such deterioration, still, to a considerable extent, 
remain altruistic toward their children and grandchildren.
Further to our discussion with regard to ﬁ  gure 4.13, we have also plot-
ted net familial transfers to the elderly by age and year in ﬁ  gure 4.14. The 
data show an upward shift of the age at which net familial transfers to the 
elderly become positive. Over the period of two decades, that age rose from 
sixty-  three years old in 1984 to sixty-  four years old in 1989, seventy-  one 
years old in 1994, seventy-  four years old in 1999, and seventy-  seven years 
old in 2004. These upward shifts over time seem to be closely related to the 
improved pension beneﬁ  ts due to the maturity of the pension schemes, but 
causality is diﬃcult to infer here. It is also interesting to observe in ﬁ  gure 
4.14 that for any given cohort, the importance of familial transfers does not 
increase much as the cohort members age. The ratio of net familial transfers 
to life cycle deﬁ  cits for the elderly who turned sixty-  ﬁ  ve in 1984 remained 
virtually unchanged, around 0.15, over the subsequent ﬁ  fteen years, until 
they reached age eighty in 1999. Similar observations are applicable to those 
who were seventy and seventy-  ﬁ  ve in 1984. These plotted results indicate 
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to be accounted for by the intercohort diﬀerentials in old- age pension matu-
rity levels, which are heavily aﬀected by the age of each cohort at which the 
universal coverage of public pension schemes was implemented.
In ﬁ  gure 4.15, we have plotted the change in the pattern of funding con-
sumption among the two elderly groups (sixty-  ﬁ  ve and older, and eighty-
 ﬁ ve and older) from 1984 to 2004. Among those aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and over, 
the role of public pensions was becoming increasingly important. In con-
trast, as has been already mentioned, familial transfers were becoming less 
important over time. Surprisingly, in 2004, the share of net familial trans-
fers in funding consumption among the elderly aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and over 
virtually disappeared, although a substantial proportion of the elderly in 
this age group were still coresiding with their adult children. It should be 
emphasized, however, that the inﬂ  ow of familial transfers from the younger 
population is still signiﬁ  cant among those aged eighty-  ﬁ  ve and over. This 
may be largely due to the fact that the elderly of this old age group receive a 
relatively limited amount of pension beneﬁ  ts as a result of (a) their shorter 
contribution period and (b) the dominance of women receiving a survivor’s 
pension in this very old age group.
Moreover, the data plotted in ﬁ  gure 4.15 indicate the share of asset- based 
reallocations has been growing substantially over time, particularly among 
the relatively young elderly, which is consistent with our earlier discussion 
in connection with ﬁ  gure 4.10. In the case of those aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and over, 
the proportion of consumption funded by asset-  based reallocations grew 
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Fig. 4.14    Net familial transfers to the elderly aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and older: Japan, 
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It is also worth remarking that the share of public transfers in the form 
of medical care services rose to a considerable extent, especially between 
1999 and 2004, which is in agreement with our earlier discussion concern-
ing the rise of per capita consumption among the elderly depicted in ﬁ  gure 
4.6. It is also interesting to observe in ﬁ  gure 4.15 that, although declining 
over time, the share of labor income is considerable, which is consistent 
with the high labor force participation rate among the elderly population in 
contemporary Japan.
4.7    Concluding  Remarks
In this chapter, we have analyzed some of the important impacts of 
Japan’s unprecedented population aging on its postwar economy, by draw-
ing heavily upon estimates from the NTA-  Japan project, ranging from the 
ﬁ  rst and second demographic dividends to life cycle reallocations. We have 
also shed light on the rapidly changing roles of public and familial support 
systems for the elderly in Japan, that have evolved together with the fam-
ily organizational transformation and the rapid development of the social 
security system over the past several decades.
As extensively discussed in the literature, Japan’s demographic landscape 
in the twenty-  ﬁ  rst century is extremely gloomy. In hope of raising marital 
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the Japanese government has formulated and implemented a series of pro-
natalist programs and policies since the early 1990s (Ogawa and Retherford 
1993; Retherford and Ogawa 2006). And yet, despite such strenuous eﬀorts, 
the country’s fertility remains very low. Judging from the extensive expe-
rience of many industrialized countries in the West, there is no apparent 
panacea for restoring fertility to the replacement level. Moreover, the use of 
immigration measures is inconceivable in contemporary Japanese society. In 
view of the results of various recent opinion surveys on the importation of 
unskilled foreign workers to Japan, it seems safe to say that the introduction 
of a large- scale immigration policy in Japan is a rather remote possibility. In 
contrast to this, although the awareness of the two demographic dividends 
is still fairly limited in Japan, their use, particularly that of the accumulated 
second demographic dividend which is likely to remain substantial for the 
next few decades, could be an option for Japan to resume steady economic 
growth.
One crucial question remains: how can Japanese elderly make use of 
their accumulated wealth? Depending upon where they invest their ﬁ  nan-
cial resources, Japan’s future economic growth performance is prone to 
diﬀer considerably. If Japanese elderly persons are provided with suﬃcient 
knowledge about the dynamics of the ﬁ  nancial market, they may have a 
good potential for investing their accumulated assets possibly outside Japan. 
Moreover, the timing of the ﬁ  rst demographic dividend for selected Asian 
countries varies considerably, as presented in ﬁ  gure 4.16. As examined ear-
lier, Japan’s ﬁ  rst dividend ended in 1979. In contrast, in the case of China, 
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In an era of globalization, the healthier and wealthier among the Japanese 
elderly will have the opportunity to invest their assets in a dynamically grow-
ing Chinese economy, and bring ﬁ  nancial gains back to Japan.
In contemporary Japan, the elderly are generally considered to be lia-
bilities. However, the analyses developed in this chapter indicate that the 
Japanese elderly represent a powerful asset to keep the country on a sound 
and steady path of growth in the years to come. Furthermore, over the past 
decade or so, they have been informally playing the role of the society’s 
safety net by providing ﬁ  nancial assistance to their adult children and grand-
children suﬀering from ﬁ  nancial diﬃculties.
In addition, as discussed elsewhere (Ogawa and Matsukura 2007), the 
number of healthy elderly persons in Japan is expected to increase signiﬁ  -
cantly in the years ahead, and their educational attainment will be higher 
than that of the elderly in the past. In other words, Japan’s future elderly will 
possess a substantial proportion of both the country’s human and ﬁ  nancial 
resources.
Before closing this chapter, it seems appropriate to oﬀer a few words of 
caution concerning the interpretation of some of the numerical results com-
puted from the NTA-  Japan project. First, as pointed out earlier, bequests 
and other capital transfers are an important ﬂ  ow not included in the pres-
ent paper. Estimating these ﬂ  ows is a diﬃcult task but one that we hope to 
address in future work.
Second, although private- sector information derived from the ﬁ  ve rounds 
of the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE) from 
1984 to 2004 is one of the most vital inputs in the NTA-  Japan project, the 
data derived from the NSFIE have limitations. For instance, although there 
are signiﬁ  cant seasonal variations in the consumption pattern, each round 
of the NSFIE covers only three months of the year (i.e., from September to 
November). Therefore, familial transfers in the form of wedding gifts, mone-
tary contributions in case of death, ﬁ  nancial assistance for university tuitions 
and housing, and so forth, may be rather poorly captured in the survey, which 
makes the estimates of familial transfers less reliable. Despite these data 
limitations, adult children are almost certainly contributing substantially less 
to their elderly parents through familial transfers than in 1984.
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Comment  Worawan Chandoevwit
The main objective of this chapter is to study the impact of population aging 
on both public and private intergenerational transfers in Japan in the last 
two decades. The highlights of the chapter are the last two sections relating 
to: (a) population aging, (b) intergeneration transfers, (c) two demographic 
dividends and changing pattern of lifecycle deﬁ  cits, and (d) life cycle real-
locations. The result from the last part is quite interesting.
This chapter systematically elaborates the facts about a rapid demographic 
transition, and changes of social security expenditure and family support. 
Generally, many of us know that Japan has already moved into aging popu-
lation, but this chapter shows how it had evolved.
Worawan Chandoevwit is research director of the Thailand Development Research In-
stitute.